Wright State University

CORE Scholar
Computer Science and Engineering Faculty
Publications

Computer Science & Engineering

10-7-2021

UFuzzer: Lightweight Detection of PHP-Based Unrestricted File
Upload Vulnerabilities Via Static-Fuzzing Co-Analysis
Jin Huang
Junjie Zhang
Wright State University - Main Campus, junjie.zhang@wright.edu

Jialun Liu
Chuang Li

Follow this and additional works at: https://corescholar.libraries.wright.edu/cse
Part of the Computer Sciences Commons, and the Engineering Commons

Repository Citation
Huang, J., Zhang, J., Liu, J., & Li, C. (2021). UFuzzer: Lightweight Detection of PHP-Based Unrestricted File
Upload Vulnerabilities Via Static-Fuzzing Co-Analysis. RAID '21: Proceedings of the 24th International
Symposium on Research in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses, 78-90.
https://corescholar.libraries.wright.edu/cse/608

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Wright State University’s CORE Scholar. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Computer Science and Engineering Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of
CORE Scholar. For more information, please contact library-corescholar@wright.edu.

UFuzzer: Lightweight Detection of PHP-Based Unrestricted File
Upload Vulnerabilities Via Static-Fuzzing Co-Analysis
Jin Huang

Junjie Zhang

Jialun Liu

Wright State University
Dayton, Ohio, USA
huang.70@wright.edu

Wright State University
Dayton, Ohio, USA
junjie.zhang@wright.edu

Wright State University
Dayton, Ohio, USA
liu.150@wright.edu

Chuang Li

Rui Dai

Wright State University
Dayton, Ohio, USA
li.213@wright.edu

University of Cincinnati
Cincinnati, Ohio, USA
rui.dai@uc.edu

ABSTRACT

2021, San Sebastian, Spain. ACM, New York, NY, USA, 13 pages. https:
//doi.org/10.1145/3471621.3471859

Unrestricted file upload vulnerabilities enable attackers to upload
malicious scripts to a web server for later execution. We have built
a system, namely UFuzzer, to effectively and automatically detect
such vulnerabilities in PHP-based server-side web programs. Different from existing detection methods that use either static program
analysis or fuzzing, UFuzzer integrates both (i.e., static-fuzzing
co-analysis). Specifically, it leverages static program analysis to
generate executable code templates that compactly and effectively
summarize the vulnerability-relevant semantics of a server-side web
application. UFuzzer then “fuzzes” these templates in a local, native
PHP runtime environment for vulnerability detection. Compared to
static-analysis-based methods, UFuzzer preserves the semantics of
an analyzed program more effectively, resulting in higher detection
performance. Different from fuzzing-based methods, UFuzzer exercises each generated code template locally, thereby reducing the
analysis overhead and meanwhile eliminating the need of operating
web services. Experiments using real-world data have demonstrated
that UFuzzer outperforms existing methods in either efficiency, or
accuracy, or both. In addition, it has detected 31 unknown vulnerable PHP scripts including 5 CVEs.

1

INTRODUCTION

Web applications with unrestricted file upload vulnerabilities allow
attackers to upload a file with malicious code, which can be later
executed on the server to enable various attacks such as information
exfiltration, spamming, phishing, and spreading malware. Such
vulnerabilities represent a pervasive threat to all web servers [8],
particularly those written in scripting languages (e.g., PHP, ASP, and
JavaScript), which require no file system permission to execute
an uploaded file with compatible scripting extensions (e.g., “.php”,
“.asp”, and “.js”).
Detecting such vulnerabilities is of significant importance. A
few systems [9, 11, 15, 17, 20] are designed to address this challenge using either static program analysis or fuzzing. Specifically,
RIPS [9, 11] and WAP [20] use static taint analysis to trace whether
a sensitive API is contaminated by untrustworthy inputs. These
two systems are applicable to detect unrestricted file upload vulnerabilities when a file write API is considered as critical API and the
super-global variable for the uploaded file is used as the untrustworthy input. WAP [20] also integrates machine learning into its
detection process. Unfortunately, it is challenging for static taint
analysis to model sanitization actions that are enforced along data
flows, thereby limiting their accuracy in detecting unrestricted file
uploading vulnerabilities.
Compared to RIPS and WAP, UChecker [15] advances the detection capability by semantically modeling applications’ file uploading behaviors. Specifically, through symbolically interpreting a PHP
application, UChecker generates constraints that model conditions
to successfully exploit an unrestricted file uploading vulnerability.
These constraints, originally expressed in PHP, are next translated
into symbolic constraints written in the language for a satisfiability solver [12], which will be eventually evaluated by this solver.
Despite the fact UChecker has demonstrated promising detection
performance, its applicability heavily depends on the PHP-to-solver
constraint translation, which is guided by manually engineered
rules. On the one hand, the variety, complexity, and flexibility of
PHP APIs are overwhelmingly larger than those of solver APIs. On
the other hand, PHP is a dynamic typing language whereas solver
languages are usually static. One salient example is that the regex
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solver is incomplete [19], which limits UChecker’s capabilities to
model and solve sophisticated PHP-based regex operations.
FUSE [17] leverages an orthogonal strategy, i.e., black-box
fuzzing, to detect such vulnerabilities. It attempts to upload various executable files to a fully operating web service and monitor
whether the uploading is successful. While FUSE can report concrete inputs for exploitation, it faces significant practical challenges.
First, it mandates operating web services, which are labor-intensive
for deployment and maintenance. Second, web services commonly
offer a large number of access points, whose expected external
inputs experience a high diversity in both structures and formats.
It is extremely challenging to address such input diversity without
a priori knowledge. In fact, FUSE needs a manually pre-specified
configuration template file that manifests a variety of parameters.
Both challenges fundamentally limit FUSE’s applicability in largescale analysis. Finally, FUSE cannot locate statements that cause
the vulnerability, offering limited information for mitigation.
In this work, we propose a novel, fully-automated vulnerability detection system, namely UFuzzer, with the following design
objectives:

presents the detection of new vulnerable programs. The related
work is discussed in Section 6. Section 7 elaborates the limitation
and potential solutions of the current design. Section 8 concludes.

2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Unrestricted File Upload
Listing 1 shows a code snippet that introduces the unrestricted
file upload vulnerability to a server-side PHP application. In this
snippet, the server receives a file from a remote client through the
$_FILES superglobal variable, which is a two-dimension array (i.e.,
$_FILES[i][j]). The first index refers to the label of the uploaded
file (i.e., $_FILES[‘newfile’]). Accessing $_FILES using the first
index returns a pre-defined one-dimensional array, which is indexed
by “name”, “type”, “tmp_name”, “error”, and “size”.
1 <? php
2
$dir = " ../ wp - content / plugins / upload /";
3
if ( isset ( $_POST [ ' action ' ]) ){
4
$localDir = $dir . time () ;
5
$fName = preg_replace (" /\ s/" , "" ,
6
$_FILES [ ' newfile ' ][ ' name ']) ;
7
if ( is_writable ( localDir )){
8
$fName = $localDir . "_" . $fName ;
9
$tmpFile = $_FILES [ ' newfile ' ][ ' tmp_name ' ];
10
move_uploaded_file ( $tmpFile , $fName );
11
12
}
13
}
14
// ...
15 ?>

• Effective and Efficient: UFuzzer should achieve high detection accuracies with low overhead.
• Minimal Dependency: UFuzzer can be sufficiently supported
by a local, native PHP runtime environment.
• Operating-Free: UFuzzer does not need an operating web
service to perform detection.
• Traceable: UFuzzer can precisely identify the statements that
introduce such vulnerabilities at the source-code level.

Listing 1: A code snippet for unrestricted file upload
vulnerability

UFuzzer with these design objectives, once built, can systematically address the challenges faced by existing detection systems.
Particularly, it avoids the semantic gaps between PHP and solver
languages that are inherent to UChecker. It also eliminates FUSE’s
dependency on operating web services.
We build UFuzzer by integrating static program analysis and
fuzzing. Specifically, UFuzzer leverages static program analysis to
identify those statements that are relevant to the unrestricted file
upload vulnerability. Then it refactors these identified statements
to make them independent of operating web services. UFuzzer next
generates executable code templates from these selected, refactored
statements. It finally “fuzzes” each template to perform detection.
Our work makes the following contributions.

Once the webserver receives a file, it automatically saves the file
and assigns it with a temporal file name, where such file name is indexed by “tmp_name” (i.e., $_FILES[‘newfile’][‘tmp_name’]
in Listing 1). The actual name of the uploaded file, which
is given by the user on the client-side, is indexed by “name”
(i.e., $_FILES[‘newfile’][‘name’] in Listing 1). The serverside PHP application can therefore access the saved file using the temporal file name. One common operation is to rename the file based on its actual name and the PHP builtin API move_uploaded_file(esr c ,edst ) is frequently used
to accomplish this goal, where esr c and edst denote the
source and destination file name, respectively. In Listing 1,
move_uploaded_file($tmpFile,$fName) is used to rename the
temporal file using its file name offered by the external user. Other
than move_uploaded_file(), another similar function, namely
file_put_content(), is also commonly used.
The vulnerability arises sice the code in Listing 1 does not disable
the upload of executable files (i.e., those with executable extensions
such as “.php”). Hence, if an attacker submits an executable script
(e.g., “test.php”) this code will faithfully store this script in the target
server with an executable file name (e.g., “test.php”).

• We have designed a novel method to detect server-side
scripts with unrestricted file upload vulnerabilities through
static-fuzzing co-analysis.
• We have built a system, namely UFuzzer, to implement this
method for PHP-based server-side web programs.
• We have evaluated UFuzzer using real-world, ground-truthavailable data. The evaluation results have demonstrated
UFuzzer outperforms existing methods in either detection
accuracies, or system performance, or both.
• We have employed UFuzzer to detect 31 new vulnerable
PHP applications by scanning a large corpus of real-world
server-side PHP applications, resulting in 5 CVEs.

2.2

Heap Graphs

We employ the intermediate representation (IR) of PHP programs,
namely heap graphs, which are first proposed in [15], to bootstrap
our analysis. Heap graphs can be generated using the interpreter
proposed in [15] by symbolically interpreting the abstract syntax
trees (AST) of a PHP-based server-side web application. Rather than

The remaining of our paper is organized as follows. We introduce
the vulnerability background in Section 2. Section 3 presents the
system design. Section 4 illustrates evaluation results and Section 5
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Heap Graph
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To the node of (concate, string, 7)

Figure 1: The heap graph for the sample code in Listing 1

symbolically interpreting AST for the entire web application, the
interpreter performs vulnerability-oriented locality analysis [15]
to identify a sub-AST for symbolic interpretation, aiming at mitigating the path explosion challenge. The sub-AST corresponds to
statements that are relevant to unrestricted file upload vulnerabilities; irrelevant statements will be ignored. In this work, we have
extended the symbolic interpreter [15] by interpreting essential
object-oriented grammars including i) class declaration, ii) object
initialization, and iii) the invocation of member functions. Specifically, our interpreter evaluates each class, recording its attributes,
method names, and methods’ bodies. We track each initialized object and its corresponding class. If a method of an object is invoked,
the interpreter will identify its method body and evaluate it.
A heap graph is a graph-based IR that models symbolic execution
results of a program along all paths towards a given statement (or
the end of the program if the given statement is not observed in
this path). A heap graph has the following essential elements:

that given statement; it also maps a variable to a node; if
a vulnerability-related API appears in this path, it uses a
special variable, namely API , to track the node of that API.
A
heap
graph
is
formally
defined
a
directed
acyclic
graph
G,
where
G
{C, S, FU NC, OP, L,T , OC , O S , O F U N C , OO P , Edдe, E}:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

• Node: A node in a heap graph refers to the evaluation result
of an expression, which could represent a concrete value, a
symbolic value, an operator, or a built-in function (e.g., an
API). Since we interpret AST to generate nodes, each node
can be precisely mapped back to the program source code.
• Edge: An edge (u, v) represents the operator-operand relationship when u denotes an operator; it represents the
function-parameter relationship when u refers to a function.
• Environment: An environment is maintained for each execution path. It records the reachability constraint (named
as cur ) for its corresponding each execution path towards

•
•
•
•
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as
=

C is a set of concrete values.
S is a set of symbolic values.
FU NC is a set of PHP built-in functions (i.e., APIs).
OP is a set of operators (e.g., “+”, “-”, and “.”).
L is a set of labels, where every object in G has a unique label.
T is a set of known data types (e.g., boolean and integer) and
an unknown type ⊥.
OC ⊂ C × T × L is a set of objects (i.e., nodes) for concrete
values.
O S ⊂ S × T × L is a set of objects (i.e., nodes) for symbolic
values.
O F U N C ⊂ FU NC × T × L is a set of objects (i.e., nodes) for
built-in functions.
OO P ⊂ Op ×T ×L is a set of objects (i.e., nodes) for operators.
Edдe ⊂ {(l 1 , l 2 )|(x, t 1 , l 1 ) ∈ O F U N C ∪ OO P and (y, t 2 , l 2 ) ∈
OC ∪ O S ∪ O F U N C ∪ OO P }.
E = {Env 1 , . . . , Envi , . . . , Envn } is a set of environments of
all execution paths of a program.
– Envi = {V ar i , Mapi , cur i , APIi } is the environment for
the i-th execution path.
– V ar i is a set of variable names.
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– Mapi ⊂ V ar i ×L establishes a mapping between a variable
name and an object.
– cur i ∈ {l |(x, t, l) ∈ OC ∪ O S ∪ O F U N C ∪ OO P }. cur i
represents the reachability constraint.
– APIi ∈ {l |(x, t, l) ∈ O F U N C }. APIi represents the node of
the API that is of security concerns.

UFuzzer will then traverse the heap graph to yield executable expressions that characterize the exploit conditions, including i) the
reachability constraint and ii) the name of the file to be permanently stored. These activities are illustrated as Step 3, 4, 5, and 6
in Figure 2. UFuzzer will next generate executable code templates
for fuzzing. Towards this end, UFuzzer will evaluate whether the
reachability constraint is tainted by the name of the uploaded file
(i.e., $_FILES[*][‘name’]) to reduce the space of variables for
fuzzing. Finally, UFuzzer will execute each template in a local PHP
environment after binding its free variables with mutated values.

Figure 1 presents the heap graph for the vulnerable code snippet
in Listing 1 towards the end of this program. Each node in this
graph is represented by a 3-tuple of (name, type, id). The “name”
in this 3-tuple is the name of an operator, the name of a builtin function, a concrete value, or a symbolic value. The “type” indicates the type of the result for an operator or a built-in function; it also indicates the type of a concrete value or a symbolic
value; it can be assigned with ⊥ if the type is unknown. The “id”
stores the node identifier, which is unique for each node in a heap
graph. This example has three execution paths in total, resulting
in three environments (see Env1, Env2, and Env3 in the graph).
Each environment maps variables to their corresponding graph
nodes. For example, the evaluation result of $dir.time() (“.” in
PHP is for concatenation) points to the node of (concat, strinд, 7).
By traversing the graph from this node towards the bottom of the
graph, we can derive the s-expression-based value of $dir.time()
as (concat, “../wpcontent/pluдin/upload/’’, time). The statement
$localDir = $dir.time() results an association between the variable $localDir and the evaluation result of $dir.time(), where
the variable $localDir is kept in the environment.
The cur in an environment points to the node from which the
reachability constraint can be derived. For example, by traversing
from the cur node in Env1, one can derive its reachability in the
form of s-expression as (AN D (is_writeable) (isset)), where nodes
(is_writeable, Boolean, 16) and (isset(), Boolean, 5) can be further
resolved into s-expressions by traversing towards the bottom of
the heap graph.
Since
the
vulnerability-related
built-in
API
move_uploaded_file(esr c , edst ) only appears in the first
execution path (i.e., Env1), Env1 has its API points to the node of
(move_upload_f ile, null, 23), whose “src” and “dst” edges point to
esr c and edst , respectively.

3

3.1

Taint Analysis

Each edge in a heap graph represents an immediate data dependency between two objects in this graph. Therefore, all edges collectively characterize global data flows among all objects along an
execution path. Taint analysis can therefore be performed using
heap graphs: given two objects (say α and β) in a heap graph (say
G), α is tainted by β (i.e., there exists an explicit data flow from β
to α) if and only if β is reachable from α in G.
The “src” edge originated from a move_uploaded_file() node
points to the source of the file to be permanently saved. This file
is untrustworthy if it is from external inputs. Currently, external
inputs are mainly modeled as global variables in UFuzzer. Therefore,
our objective is to verify if the move_uploaded_file() node is
tainted by a node of a global variable through its “src” edge. This
could be effectively fulfilled by UFuzzer. For example, the node
of the FILES global variable (i.e., the node ($_F ILES, array, 11)) is
reachable from the move_uploaded_file() node (i.e., node 23) in
Figure 1 through its “src” edge, indicating that the source file of the
move_uploaded_file() API is tainted by external inputs.

3.2

Graph Refactoring With Symbolic Values

We fuzz three data sources including i) uninitialized variables, ii)
superglobal variables, and iii) certain built-in APIs. UFuzzer will
refactor heap graphs by replacing their corresponding nodes with
nodes of symbolic values.
Uninitialized Variables: Our symbolic interpreter performs
vulnerability-oriented locality analysis [15] to identify a sub-AST
for symbolic interpretation, aiming at mitigating the path explosion
challenge. Therefore, it is possible to encounter uninitialized variables in the sub-AST. For an uninitialized variable, we first create a
node of a symbolic value and next establish an association between
this variable and this node.
Superglobal Variables: Superglobal variables are used by external
users to offer information to a web service. Therefore, we create a
node of symbolic value when interpreting a superglobal variable,
whose type is considered as “string”.
It is worth noting that UFuzzer handles $_FILES as a special
case since its structure is known a priori. Specifically, $_FILES is
a pre-structured array that is indexed by 5 keys including “name”,
“type”, “tmp_name”, “error”, and “size”; these 5 keys represent the
original file name, the type information, the temporal filename, the
error information, and the size of the file. Therefore, we traverse a
heap graph and identify all array_access nodes where each such
node satisfies two conditions: i) its “array” edge points to another
array_access whose “array” edge connects a node of the $_F ILES

SYSTEM DESIGN

Figure 2 presents the architectural overview of UFuzzer.
UFuzzer first scans each program of a PHP server-side web application and identifies whether it contains any file uploading
API (i.e., move_uploaded_file() and file_put_content()). If so,
UFuzzer will leverage the inter-procedural, context-aware symbolic
interpreter in [15] to generate a heap graph for this program towards each identified file uploading API or the end of the program
(i.e., Step 1 in Figure 2). Next, for each environment in a heap graph,
we will preserve it if its API , null (i.e., an execution path that
contains a file uploading API), which is illustrated as Step 2 in
Figure 2.
For each preserved environment, UFuzzer will first evaluate
whether the source file of a file uploading API is derived from
an untrustworthy source via taint analysis. It will next refactor
the graph with symbolic values, which are used to model superglobal variables, uninitialized variables, and certain built-in APIs.
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Heap Graphs

⁃
⁃
⁃
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RAID ’21, October 6–8, 2021, San Sebastian, Spain

⁃
Step 4

Step 2

Step 3: Taint analysis
Step 4: Refactor the graph with symbol values
Step 5: Derive the expression for the reachability constraint
(say, R) and its depending symbolic values (say, r1, r2, …, rN)
Step 6: Derive the expression for the name of the stored file
(say, D) and its depending symbolic values (say, d1, d2, ….dM)

is R tainted by
$_FILES[*][‘name’]

Yes

is_vulnerable(r1,.., rN, d1, …, dM){
if(R && endsWith(D, “.php”))
return true;
return false;
}

No

is_vulnerable(d1,…dM){
if(endsWith(D, “.php”))
return true;
return false;
}

Figure 2: The architectural overview of UFuzzer

refactoring
(array_access)
array

idx

(array_access) (“name”)
array

idx

($_FILES) (“newfile”)
$_FILES[“newfile”][“name”]

refactoring
(concat)

(fread)

(sym_FILES_name)
(sym_FILES_ext)
(array_access)
array
($_FILES)

(“name”)

(fopen)

idx
(“newfile”)

(sym_fread)

len

handle

(10)

name

mode

(“temp.txt”)

(“r”)

(sym_fopen)
(“temp.txt”)

(10)

(“r”)

sym_FILES_name.sym_FILES_ext

Figure 4: An example of refactoring a fread node with a node
of symbolic value (i.e., sym_f r ead).

Figure 3: An example of refactoring an array_access
node associated with the $_FILES superglobal variable.
The sub-tree rooted in the top ar r ay_access denotes
$_FILES[“newfile”][“name”]. This ar r ay_access node will be
replaced by a node that concatenates two symbolic values of
the filename and the extension, respectively.

Operation and Validation APIs: Some APIs in the server-side
web program can only function in a properly configured run-time
environment, making automatic analysis extremely challenging.
These APIs are often used for operations of networking, databases,
and file access, which can only function in a properly configured
run-time environment. We name such APIs as operation APIs.
UFuzzer will traverse a heap graph and identify every node if it
corresponds to any API that is used for networking, databases, and
file operations. For an identified node, UFuzzer replaces this node
using a node of the symbolic value, whose type will be simultaneously derived based on the API. Figure 4 shows an example, where
the node of fopen and that of fread have been replaced using two
symbolic nodes including sym_fopen and sym_fread, respectively.
We respectively assign the pointer type and the string type to
these two nodes based on the definition of these APIs.
We also symbolize PHP validation functions (e.g., those with
“is_” as prefixes) to improve the efficiency of the fuzzing. Examples of such functions include isset(), is_writable(), and
is_string(). For example, these functions are widely used by PHP
programs, which only outputs TRUE or FALSE but have infinite input spaces. Hence, we symbolize these functions regardless of their
arguments. For example, any node of isset() in the heap graph

global variable; ii) its “index” edge points to one of the keys (with
the string type) including “name”, “type”, “tmp_name”, “error”, and
“size”. The first condition indicates this is the access to the 2nd
dimension of $_FILES superglobal variable and the second condition
illustrates the specific key used for accessing the second dimension
of $_FILES. We will replace this array_access using a symbolicvalue-based node in the heap graph. If this symbolic-value-based
node corresponds to the “size” or “error” index, its type will be “int”;
otherwise, it will be “string”.
Figure 3 presents an example, where the type and label for each
node is omitted for briefness. Specifically, the node (array_access)
satisfies both conditions, indicating that this node and its underlying
sub-tree together represent $_FILES[“newfile”][“name”]. Therefore,
UFuzzer replaces this node using the concatenation of two symbolic nodes, namely sym_F ILES_name and sym_F ILES_ext. Here,
sym_F ILES_name represents the file name and sym_F ILES_ext
refers to the extension.
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Figure 7: The sub-tree for the reachability constraint derived
from Figure 1 after the node (is_writable, Boolean, 16) is
symbolized into (sym_is_writable, Boolean, 30)

Figure 5: An example of refactoring a isset node with a node
of symbolic value (i.e., sym_isset _P O ST _act ion).
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Figure 6: An example of type inference. Inferring the type of
the symbolic node using its immediate operator node.

Figure 8: The sub-tree for the filename derived from Figure 1

will be replaced using a symbol node with boolean type. Figure 5
presents an example. The node of isset(), which is corresponding
to the expression of isset($_POST[‘action’]), will be replaced
by a symbol node of sym_isset_POST _action.
Lightweight Type Inference: The type information is assigned
when a symbolic node for either a superglobal variable or a selected
APIs is created. However, it is uncertain for those nodes created
for uninitialized variables. To address this challenge, we perform
lightweight type inference. Specifically, we identify the operator
node or an API node that immediately depends on this node (i.e., has
an edge to this node). We next use the expected operand/argument
types to infer the type of this node. Figure 6 presents an example,
where we assign “boolean” to a symbolic node of an uninitialized
variable since it serves as the operand for the “negate” operator.

3.3

The core function is to generate executable expressions by
traversing these two sub-trees. As illustrated in Algorithm 1, we
have designed an algorithm to evaluate each sub-tree (starting from
its root node) and leverage an existing parser (i.e., PHP-Parser [22])
to build an AST, which will be finally converted into PHP code
through the pretty printing function of this parser.
Algorithm 1 Generating AST from A Sub-Tree in Heap Graph
1: function eval (v )
2:
switch v .дetT ype() do
3:
case scal ar
4:
val ← v .дetV alue()
5:
type ← v .дetT ype()
6:
return new _Scal ar _(val, type)
7:
case symbol
8:
val ← v .дetV alue()
9:
type ← v .дetT ype()
10:
return new _var _(val, type)
11:
...
12:
case binaryO P
13:
el e f t ← eval (v .дet Lef t ())
14:
e r iдht ← eval (v .дet Riдht ())
15:
op ← v .дetOper ator ()
16:
return new _BinaryOp(op, el e f t , e r iдht )
17:
case f unc
18:
name ← v .дet N ame()
19:
< ar д1, . . . , ar дn > ← v .дet Ar дs()
20:
ar д _list ← []
21:
for i = 1...n do

Deriving Executable Expressions for The
Reachability Constraint and The File Name

For each preserved environment after heap graph refactoring,
UFuzzer will generate expressions of constraints for both the reachability and the filename, and next integrate them into a function
with fuzzing variables as function arguments.
The cur variable in an environment is bound to the node that
represents the reachability constraint and we name this node as
vr each . The API variable in an environment is bound to the node
of a file uploading API. The “dst” edge from this API node points
to the node that represents the name of the file to be permanently
saved and we name this node as v f il ename . For each preserved
environment, we can traverse the heap graph from vr each and
v f il ename to generate sub-trees of all relevant nodes. Figures 7
and 8 present sub-trees for vr each and v f il ename derived from
Figure 1, respectively.

. [] : empty list

ar д _list .add(eval (ar дs[i]))

22:
end for
23:
return new _F uncCall _(name, ar д _list )
24:
...
25: end function

It is worth noting that our algorithm needs to recursively interpret all types of nodes in a heap graph. But for briefness, Algorithm 1 only presents the interpretation of nodes for constants,

83

UFuzzer: Lightweight Detection of PHP-Based Unrestricted File Upload Vulnerabilities Via Static-Fuzzing Co-Analysis

symbolic values, binary operators, and function calls. The interpretation will return an AST built through PHP-parser’s APIs (i.e.,
“new _Object_(...)”).
scalar : If eval() sees a scalar node it will return a scalar AST node,
i.e., “new _Scalar _(val, type)’’, where val and type represent its
value and type respectively.
symbol: When eval() sees a symbol node sym, it returns a variable AST node, i.e., “(new _var _(val, type))”, where val and type
represent the value and the type of this symbolic node, respectively.
binaryOP: Upon visiting a node for a binary operator, eval()
will first recursively interpret its left and right child nodes
and derive two AST nodes, denoted as el e f t and er iдht , respectively. Each of these two AST nodes could be the root of
another AST tree. Finally,eval() will return an AST node, i.e.,
“new _BinaryOp(op, el e f t , er iдht )”.
f unc: When processing a node for function all, eval() will first
derive the name of the function call and all nodes of its arguments.
This algorithm will then retrieve the AST node for each argument
through recursive evaluation (i.e., eval(arдs[i])). Finally, it will return a function call AST node, i.e., new _FuncCall_(name, arд_list).

3.4
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refers to an arbitrary string. If not, it indicates that the reachability
constraint does not verify the name of the uploaded file, implying
no sanitization checks are enforced for the name of the uploaded
file. Therefore, we only use fuzzing to evaluate the name of the
file to be saved, thereby using the fuzzing template generated by
Algorithm 3. If the reachability constraint is indeed tainted by
$_FILES[*][‘name’], we will perform fuzzing to jointly evaluate the
reachability constraint and the name of the file to be saved, thereby
using the template generated by Algorithm 2.
Listing 2 and Listing 3 present two fuzzing templates for Listing 1,
which are generated by Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 3, respectively.
In these two fuzzing templates, $sym_file_name, $sym_file_ext,
$sym_isset_POST_action, and $sym_is_writable are variables to be
mutated, where the first two have the type of strings and the last two
are boolean. The pathinfo function used in fuzzing templates is a
PHP built-in API for returning the extension of a file name with parameter PATHINFO_EXTENSION. The “in_array($ext, array(‘php’)”
is to check whether the extension is ‘php’, which can be easily
extended to include additional sensitive extensions (e.g., ‘jsp’).
1 <? php
2
function is_vulnerable ( $sym_file_name ,
3
$sym_file_ext ,
4
$sym_isset_POST_action ,
5
$sym_is_writable )
6
{
7
$exp_reach = $sym_isset_POST_action and
8
$sym_is_writable ;
9
$exp_fileName = " ../ wp - content / plugins / upload /" .
10
time () . "_" .
11
preg_replace (" /\ s/" , "" ,
12
$sym_file_name .
13
$sym_file_ext );
14
if ( $exp_reach ){
15
$ext = pathinfo ( $exp_fileName ,
16
PATHINFO_EXTENSION );
17
if ( in_array ( $ext , array ( ' php '))){
18
return TRUE ;
19
}
20
}
21
return FALSE ;
22
}
23 ?>

Generate Fuzzing Templates

By leveraging the expression generation algorithm in Algorithm 1,
we can generate executable code templates, namely fuzzing templates, as presented in Algorithm 2. Arguments r 1 , . . . , r N represent
all symbolic nodes in the sub-tree rooted in vr each (i.e., the subtree for the reachability constraint); arguments d 1 , . . . , d M refer
to all symbolic nodes in the sub-tree rooted in v f il ename . The
prettyprint() function outputs a decompiled version of the AST in
a format that is a legal PHP program for execution in a standard
PHP running environment.
Algorithm 2 Fuzzing Template With Reachability
1: function is_vulnerable(r 1, . . . , r N , d 1, . . . , d M )
2:
expr e ach ← pr et typr int (eval (v r e ach ))
3:
exp f il e name ← pr et typr int (eval (v f il ename ))
4:
if expr e ach then
5:
ex t ← дet _ex t ension(exp f il ename )
6:
if ex t == “php 00 then
7:
return T RU E
8:
end if
9:
end if
10:
return F ALS E
11: end function

Listing 2: The Fuzzing Template With Reachability
Evaluated for Listing 1
1 <? php
2
function is_vulnerable ( $sym_file_name ,
3
$sym_file_ext )
4
{
5
$exp_fileName = " ../ wp - content / plugins / upload /" .
6
time () . "_" .
7
preg_replace (" /\ s/" , "" ,
8
$sym_file_name .
9
$sym_file_ext );
10
11
$ext = pathinfo ( $exp_fileName , PATHINFO_EXTENSION );
12
if ( in_array ( $ext , array ( ' php '))){
13
return TRUE ;
14
}
15
return FALSE ;
16
}
17 ?>

Algorithm 3 Fuzzing Template Without Reachability
1: function is_vulnerable(d 1, . . . , d M )
2:
exp f il e name ← pr et typr int (eval (v f il ename ))
3:
ex t ← дet _ex t ension(exp f il ename )
4:
if ex t == “php 00 then
5:
return T RU E
6:
end if
7:
return F ALS E
8: end function

Listing 3: The Fuzzing Template Without Reachability
Evaluated for Listing 1

It will drastically increase fuzzing efficiency if we can reduce the
number of variables to be mutated. Towards this end, we develop
the following rules:
We assess whether the reachability constraint is tainted by
$_FILES[*][‘name’], the name of the uploaded file, where “*” here

Since the reachability constraint of Listing 1 is not tainted by
the name of the uploaded file (i.e., $_FILES[*][‘name’]), the fuzzing
template in Listing 3 will be used for fuzzing. As shown by this
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Tools for Comparison: We have compared UFuzzer with
UChecker [15], RIPS [9, 11], WAP [20], and FUSE [17]. We have
deployed them in the same running environment of UFuzzer.
Evaluation Results: Table 1 presents the detection results and
the running time for UFuzzer, UChecker, RIPS, WAP, and FUSE. The
second and third columns in Table 1 present the names and lines
of code (LoC) for each sample, respectively. The fourth column
presents the number of fuzzing templates generated by UFuzzer.
The remaining columns demonstrate the detection result and the
running time for each program, where 4 and 6 stand for “detected”
and “undetected”, respectively. The last two rows of Table 1 summarize the detection rates and the false positive rates.
UFuzzer is effective and efficient on the ground-truth available
dataset. It detects 26 vulnerable samples out of 27 without incurring
any false positive. The running time is mostly within one second
for vulnerable cases and within one minute for non-vulnerable
ones. UFuzzer fails to detect Cimy User Extra Fields 2.3.8 since its
underlying symbolic interpreter crashes due to path explosion.

example, it drastically reduces the fuzzing space by eliminating two
free variables to use the fuzzing template in Listing 3 compared to
that in Listing 2 without undermining the detection accuracy.

3.5

Executing a Fuzzing Template

We then execute each fuzzing template to assess whether its corresponding PHP script is vulnerable. It starts with assigning values
to arguments in the fuzzing template (i.e., in the is_vulnerable()
function), following rules below:
• $sym_file_ext: if this argument refers to the extension of
the name for the original uploaded file, we build a set of
sensitive extensions such as “.php”, “.gif.php”, “.mp3.php”,
“.zip.php”, “pdf.php”, and “.jpg.php”.
• $sym_file_name or an argument with the string type: if
this argument represents the extension-removed name of
the uploaded file or its type is string, we leverage a PHP
Fuzzer [23] as a drop-in fuzzer to mutate string values
for $sym_file_name. We use different mutators in PHP
Fuzzer [23] such as EraseBytes, InsertByte, ChangeByte,
ChangeBit, and ChangeASCIIInt. For each mutator, we iterate for 50 times with a length between 5 and 70.
• An argument with the boolean type (e.g., $sym_is_*): We
enumerate both True and False values to this argument if
it is a boolean type.
• An argument with the number type: We enumerate values
in [−20, 20] for an argument if it has the number type (e.g.,
integer, float, and double).
We execute each fuzzing template by iterating over arguments’
different values. If any execution returns True, we will cease the
iteration and report that the PHP script is vulnerable. If no template
returns True after all mutated values are exhausted, UFuzzer will
stop and report this web application as non-vulnerable. We admit
that the selection of these fuzzing parameters in UFuzzer, similar to
that in other fuzzers, are empirical rather than provable. Nevertheless, they are highly configurable to support practical deployment.

4

1 < php ?
2 $valid_chars_regex = '.A -Z0 -9 _␣!@#$ %^&() +={}\[\]\ ' ,~ ` - ';
3 $file_name = preg_replace ( ' /[^ '. $valid_chars_regex . ' ]|\.+ $/i ', ""
, basename ( $_FILES [ $upload_name ][ ' name ' ]) );
4 /* ... */
5 if (! @ move_uploaded_file (
6
$_FILES [ $upload_name ][ " tmp_name "],
7
$save_path . $file_name )) {
8
/* ... */ }
9 ?>

Listing 4: UChecker fails to correctly model the regex
operation in the PDW Media File Browser plugin

Compared with UChecker, UFuzzer accomplishes a comparable
detection rate (i.e., 26/27 of UFuzzer v.s. 25/27 of UChecker, with 0
false positive for both). Although UFuzzer outperforms UChecker by
detecting only one more vulnerable sample (i.e., PDW Media File
Browser 1.1), this single sample alone is significant to demonstrate
how UFuzzer addresses the intrinsic limitation faced by UChecker.
Specifically, this vulnerable application employs a regular expression operation as presented in Listing 4, which is challenging to be
effectively modeled and solved by satisfiability solvers (and hence
UChecker). In contrast, UFuzzer can easily execute this operation
in a native PHP run-time environment.
Although both RIPS and WAP accomplish comparable efficiency
with UFuzzer, they have lower detection performances. Specifically,
RIPS suffers from a high false positive rate of 12/32. WAP demonstrates a low detection rate of 10/27.
FUSE has accomplished a lower detection rate of 9/27 and the
same false positive rate of 0/32. In addition, FUSE requires significantly longer time for detection, typically around a few hours.
It is also worthy noting that it has taken an excessive amount of
manual efforts to make each PHP application fully operable, which
is unfortunately required by FUSE. When an application fails to
function, FUSE will miss the opportunity to perform detection. Samples annotated with “N/A” in Table 1 represent such cases. Despite
our best efforts, these samples failed to operate in our evaluation
environment, mainly because of missed files or unknown configuration problems. Such evaluation results imply that FUSE has limited
applicability for large-scale vulnerability scanning.

GROUND-TRUTH-AVAILABLE
EVALUATION

We have implemented UFuzzer with approximately 28K LoC, which
reuses the AST-based symbolic interpreter in [15] with minor improvements. We leveraged PHP-Parser [22] for AST construction
and pretty printing. UFuzzer is deployed on an Ubuntu 18.04 LTS
64-bits operating system with AMD Fx-8350 CPU, 16 GB of memory,
and PHP 7.4. As our data contains a large set of real-world, opensource plugins collected from WordPress, we install WordPress
libraries in our running environment.
Data: We have collected 27 publicly-reported vulnerable PHP applications. These 27 samples consists of 13 known samples used
in [15], 3 new vulnerable applications detected by UChecker [15],
and 11 more vulnerable samples we have recently collected. We
have identified 32 vulnerability-free server-side PHP applications
that support file upload capabilities. It is worth noting that it is
a labor-intensive process to collect publicly available, real-world
samples and verify whether they are vulnerable. Such challenge is
mainly attributed to the diversity of server-side applications, their
highly customized interfaces, and the high complexity.
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System

NonVulnerable

Results

Fuzzing
Templates

Detected by
UFuzzer

Detected by
UChecker

Detected by
RIPS

Detected by
WAP

Detected by
FUSE

2

4 (0.26s)

4 (0.50s)

4 (0.01s)

6 (0.58s)

6 (1.53h)

Audio Record 1.0
Baggagefreight Shipping 0.1.0
Estatik 2.2.5
File Provider 1.2.3
Finale - WooCommerce Sales Countdown Timer 2.8.0
N-Media Website Contact Form with File Uploader 1.3.4
Image Gallery with Slideshow 1.5.2
Open Flash Chart Core 0.4
PDW Media File Browser 1.1
Ip Blocker Lite 10.2
Uploadify 1.0.0
WooCommerce Custom Profile Picture 1.0
WooCommerce Catalog Enquiry 3.0.1
WooCommerce Checkout Manager 4.2.5
WP Marketplace 2.4.1
wp-Powerplaygallery 3.3
WP Seo Spy 3.1
WP Demo Buddy 1.0.2
Avatar Uploader 6.x-1.2
Foxypress 0.4.1.1-0.4.2.1
Asset Manager 0.2
Simple Ad Manager 2.5.94
SpamTask 1.3.6
MailCWP 1.100
Joomla-Bible-study 9.1.1
Cimy User Extra Fields 2.3.8

342
5,581
9,823
983
28,643
1,857
569
2,337
20,664
5,574
285
138
3,560
14,942
13,956
2,752
3,431
2,208
495
13,358
3,784
1,937
3,434
4,3191
87,626
9,432

1
1
3
1
6
14
2
2
1
1
1
16
8
8
1
416
2
8
1
64
1
4
2
1
16
100000+

4 (0.29s)
4 (0.78s)
4 (0.89s)
4 (0.24s)
4 (4.91s)
4 (0.26s)
4 (0.34s)
4 (0.35s)
4 (3.59s)
4 (1.46s)
4 (0.20s)
4 (0.15s)
4 (0.67s)
4 (1.70s)
4 (2.6s)
4 (1.33s)
4 (0.50s)
4 (0.34s)
4 (0.22s)
4 (1.79s)
4 (0.22s)
4 (1.24s)
4 (0.61s)
4 (5.01s)
4 (13.70s)
6 (N/A)

4 (0.53s)
4 (1.12s)
4 (1.72s)
4 (0.40s)
4 (5.01s)
4 (1.23s)
4 (0.35s)
4 (0.70s)
6 (4.01s)
4 (0.99s)
4 (0.31s)
4 (0.28s)
4 (1.21s)
4 (0.96s)
4 (2.60s)
4 (2.78s)
4 (0.57s)
4 (0.28s)
4 (52.74s)
4 (2.98s)
4 (0.81s)
4 (5.35s)
4 (0.61s)
4 (5.80s)
4 (13.72s)
6 (N/A)

4 (0.01s)
4 (0.10s)
4 (0.31s)
4 (0.02s)
4 (0.42s)
4 (0.06s)
4 (0.04s)
4 (0.10s)
4 (3.68s)
4 (0.05s)
4 (0.01s)
6 (0.01s)
4 (0.09s)
4 (0.70s)
4 (0.32s)
4 (0.07s)
4 (0.07s)
4 (0.06s)
4 (0.01s)
4 (0.30s)
4 (0.04s)
4 (0.33s)
4 (0.15s)
4 (1.26s)
4 (1.31s)
4 (0.97s)

6 (0.39s)
4 (1.00s)
6 (1.00s)
6 (0.65s)
6 (1.00s)
6 (0.624s)
4 (0.94s)
4(0.94s)
4 (1.00s)
6 (0.73s)
4 (0.53s)
6 (0.44s)
6 (1.00s)
6 (1.00s)
6 (1.00s)
6 (0.86s)
4 (1.00s)
6 (1.00s)
6 (0.54s)
4 (2.00s)
6 (0.87s)
4 (1.00s)
4 (1.00s)
4 (2.00s)
4 (1.00s)
6 (1.00s)

6 (1.28h)
4 (1.38h)
6 (2.17h)
6 (1.85h)
4 (0.33h)
4 (1.38h)
6 (4.35h)
6 (1.80h)
6 (3.03h)
6 (1.53h)
6 (1.43h)
6 (1.55h)
4 (0.33h)
4 (0.33h)
4 (0.33h)
4 (2.21h)
4 (0.81h)
6 (2.95h)
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
4 (5.50h)

Fullscreen background slider 1.1

8,324

2

6 (7.09s)

6 (0.91s)

4 (0.01s)

6 (0.62s)

6 (1.80h)

TinyPNG for WordPress 0.2
Mobile AppWidget 1.2
BackupGuard 1.1.46
WooCommerce Catalog Enquiry 3.1.0 (Fixed version)
Telegram-chat 3.0.4
Just a simple popup 2.0.1
Booster for WooCommerce 2.8.2
Morbits SMS 1.0
Eventer 0.1.0
Customize Random Avatar 1.0.0
IntelliWidget Custom Post Types 1.1.1
PHP Event Calendar 1.5

256
2,873
10,509
3,545
2,665
948
47,689
71,787
377
1,254
903
10,730

8
3
6
2
4
4
40
1
2
2
2
1

6 (6.17s)
6 (9.95s)
6 (14.07s)
6 (6.88s)
6 (5.76s)
6 (8.36s)
6 (190.81s)
6 (175.31s)
6 (1.70s)
6 (7.73s)
6 (5.79s)
6 (11.95s)

6 (0.33s)
6 (0.91s)
6 (3.01s)
6 (1.09s)
6 (0.67s)
6 (0.38s)
6 (25.81s)
6 (27.00s)
6 (2.01s)
6 (0.94s)
6 (0.40s)
6 (1.41s)

6 (0.01s)
4 (0.07s)
4 (7.79s)
4 (0.09s)
4 (0.06s)
4 (0.02s)
4 (39.46s)
4 (11.84s)
4 (0.02s)
4 (0.02s)
4 (0.02s)
4 (1.34s)

6 (0.64s)
6 (1.00s)
6 (1.00s)
6 (1.00s)
6 (0.88s)
6 (0.48s)
6 (14.00s)
6 (2.00s)
4 (0.70s)
4 (0.70s)
6 (0.47s)
6 (1.00s)

6 (1.80h)
6 (1.81h)
6 (4.28h)
6 (1.43h)
6 (1.83h)
6 (1.61h)
6 (1.41h)
6 (1.81h)
6 (1.68h)
6 (1.73h)
6 (1.61h)
N/A

26/27
0/32

25/27
0/32

26/27
12/32

10/27
2/32

9/27
0/32

Adblock Blocker 0.0.1

Known
Vulnerable

LoCs
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369

Detection Rate
False Positive Rate

Table 1: Evaluation Results Using Ground-Truth-Available Data (4 and 6 refer to vulnerable and non-vulnerable, respectively).
UFuzzer detects 26 out of 27 known vulnerable scripts with no false positives; it outperforms UChecker, RIPS, and WAP.

5

DETECTING NEW VULNERABLE PHP
APPLICATIONS

files (e.g., required database configuration files are missing). We
therefore manually review their source code thoroughly. All of
these 32 vulnerable applications have not been previously reported
to the best of our knowledge.
Among these 32 vulnerable applications, UFuzzer detects 31
whereas UChecker only detects 15. UFuzzer also effectively identifies the source of each vulnerable application, i.e., the file name
and the line no. of the vulnerable statement (see the 4th column
of Table 2). Manual analysis reveals that some APIs of false negatives introduced by UChecker are not currently covered in its
PHP-to-Z3 translation rules. Comparatively, UFuzzer executes these
PHP APIs in native PHP runtime environment. UFuzzer misses
one vulnerable sample since UFuzzer was not successful in mutating inputs that satisfy their reachability conditions. For example, the fuzzing template of Gallerio 1.0.1 has the reachability condition of $reach_reach = ($sym_Isset_POST_doadd
and $_POST_doadd_symbol == ‘yes’ and $sym_file_name .
$sym_file_ext != ‘’) and the string mutator fails to generate
‘yes’ for the free variable $_POST_doadd_symbol.
Among these 32 vulnerable applications, our manual investigation reveals that 13 samples need administration privilege for

We have used UFuzzer to detect PHP applications with unrestricted
file upload vulnerabilities. We leverage two repositories, including WordPress plugins and GitHub, which both offer a large number of PHP-based, open-source applications. We collected 9,157
WordPress plugins in a reverse chronological order (starting from
4/22/2018) based on their last updated time. We also retrieved source
code of top 900 highly rated (i.e., “start”-ed) PHP content management systems (CMS) from GitHub (on 07/01/2020). Since UChecker
achieved comparable detection performance on the ground-truthavailable data, we also use it to scan all these applications.
Table 2 presents the detection results. UFuzzer and UChecker
together detect 32 vulnerable applications. The first 21 are from
GitHub and the remaining 11 are WordPress plugins. We have confirmed all of them allow the uploading of PHP files through i) actual
exploiting or ii) code review. The “verification method” column in
the table presents how each application is verified. Specifically, 16
out of 32 applications can be installed and we have successfully
exploited their file uploading vulnerabilities. The remaining 16 applications fail to operate mainly due to the lack of configuration
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No.

Application

UFuzzer

Vuln Source
File : Line No.

UChecker

Verification
Method

Root
Cause

Admin
Required?

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

Basic-Laravel-CMS - PHP Framework For Web Artisans
BloggerCMS - Easiest Static Blog Generator
Lapin_CMS - Slim 3 RAD Skeleton
Learningphp-CMS
Mini_CMS - PHP Based Mini Blog
laravelCMS - PHP Framework For Web Artisans
WikiDocs - Databaseless Markdown Wiki Engine
Buffalo-Webpage-CMS
LCMS - College Website with CMS
Palette - PHP Based Site Builder
Progress_Business - CMS for Company Profile Web
publisher.mod - FlatCore CMS Module
User-Management-PHP-MYSQL
MicroCMS1 - CMS Based On Model-View-Controller
BlogStop - Simple Content Management System
CMS-Blogging-System - Blog Made with PHP and
MySQL
Cmsphp - Simple PHP based CMS System
CMSPortfolio - PHP based Portfolio Template
CMSProjectPHP
CMSsite - Simple CMS Site
CmsV1 - CMS Based on PHP
N5 Upload Form 1.0
Testimonials King Light 0.1
WP-Curriculo Vitae Free 6.1
Easy Form Builder 1.0
imagements 1.2.5
Event Banner 1.3
Quick Image Transform 1.0.1
College Publisher Import 0.1
BSK Files Manager 1.0.0
Banner Cycler 1.4
Gallerio 1.0.1

4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4

uploader.php:31
Image.php:77
upload.php:36
upload.php:41
zamiesc-post.php:40
ProfileController.php:29
submit.php:264
actionProductoCtrl.php:81
student_avatar.php:13
upload.php:27
adding_news.php:12
upload.php:29
edit-user.php:32
uploads.php:31
admin_edit_post.php:22

4
6
6
4
4
4
6
6
4
6
4
6
4
6
6

Code Review
Code Review
Code Review
Code Review
Exploiting
Code Review
Code Review
Code Review
Code Review
Code Review
Exploiting
Code Review
Exploiting
Code Review
Exploiting

LS
SInS
SInS
LS
SInS
SInS
SInS
SInS
LS
LS
LS
SInS
SC
LS
LS

No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes

4

add_post.php:15

4

Code Review

LS

Yes

4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
6

add_post.php:21
func.php:464
add_post.php:16
profile.php:27
add_user.php:21
n5uploadform.php:156
testimonial-king-form.php:38
enviarCadastro.php:86
newForm.php:49
imagements.php:127
admin_events.php:29
file-upload.php:79
college-publisher-import.php:144
bsk-files-manager.php:269
admin.php:167
gallerio.php:610

4
6
4
6
4
6
6
6
4
4
6
6
6
6
6
4

Code Review
Code Review
Code Review
Exploiting
Code Review
Exploiting
Code Review
Exploiting
Exploiting
Exploiting
Exploiting
Exploiting
Exploiting
Exploiting
Exploiting
Exploiting

LS
SInS
LS
LS
LS
LS
MisAPI
LS
LS
SInS
LS
SC
LS
MisAPI
LS
LS

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

CVE

CVE-2021-24223
CVE-2021-24222
CVE-2021-24224
CVE-2021-24236
CVE-2021-24251

Table 2: Detecting New Vulnerable Applications. UFuzzer detected 31 vulnerable PHP applications that have not been previously reported, where 1-21 are from GitHub and 22-32 are WordPress plugins. Each vulnerability is verified through either exploiting or thorough
code review. The root cause of each vulnerable sample has also been labeled, where LS for “lacking sanitization”, MisAPI for “misusing
sanitization APIs”, SInS for “sanitizing incorrect sources”, and SC for “sanitizing at the client”.

15 ?>

successful exploitation. While these 13 applications require attackers to gain higher privileges, they may still lead to unintended
behaviors that could be potentially misused. In fact, one of such
examples, Event Banner 1.3, receives CVE-2021-24251.
We attribute root causes of these 32 new vulnerable applications
into four categories including lacking sanitization (LS), misusing
sanitization APIs (MisAPI), sanitizing incorrect sources (SInS), and
sanitizing at the client (SC). To further illustrate each root cause,
we present a few representative cases below.
Lacking Sanitization: Basic Laravel CMS is a content management system (CMS). Its vulnerable code is presented in Listing 5,
which does not check the extension of the uploaded file. Although
the developer attempts to randomize the name of the saved file, the
random number is derived from a very narrow range and therefore highly predictable. Listing 6 shows the fuzzing template that
successfully detects this vulnerability, which evaluates both the
reachability condition and the file extension.

Listing 5: Vulnerable Code of Basic Laravel CMS
1 function is_Vulnerable_0 ( string $sym_file_name ,
2
string $sym_file_ext ,
3
int $_FILES_file_error_symbol ){
4
$exp_reach = ( $sym_file_name . $sym_file_ext and
5
! $_FILES_file_error_symbol );
6
$funCall = explode ( '. ' , $sym_file_name . $sym_file_ext );
7
$exp_filename = '/ public / images / ' . ( md5 ( rand (100 , 200) ) .
8
'. ' . $funCall [1]) ;
9
if ( $exp_reach ) {
10
$ext = pathinfo ( $exp_filename , PATHINFO_EXTENSION );
11
if ( in_array ( $ext , array ( ' php '))) {
12
return true ;
13
}
14
}
15 }

Listing 6: A Fuzzing Template for Basic Laravel CMS

Misusing Sanitization APIs: Misusing Sanitization APIs: BSK
Files Manager 1.0.0 [5] is a WordPress plugin for file management. However, it does not guarantee that the file provided is a
legitimate file extension and allows high privilege users to upload
arbitrary files including “.php” or “.exe” files. Listing 7 presents the
vulnerable code snippet. We suspect this vulnerability is rooted in
the mis-interpretation of the “sanitize_file_name()”, a WordPress built-in API. This function is for removing special illegal
characters rather than guaranteeing to return a filename that is
allowed to be uploaded [38]. Therefore, a file with the executable
“.php” extension can still be uploaded. The fuzzing template that

1 <? php
2 if ( $_FILES [ ' file ' ][ ' name ' ]) {
3
if (! $_FILES [ ' file ' ][ ' error ']) {
4
$name = md5 ( rand (100 , 200) );
5
$ext = explode ( '. ' , $_FILES [ ' file ' ][ ' name ' ]) ;
6
$filename = $name . '. ' . $ext [1];
7
$destination = '/ public / images / ' . $filename ;
8
$location = $_FILES [" file " ][ " tmp_name " ];
9
move_uploaded_file ( $location , $destination );
10
// ...
11
} else {
12
// ...
13
}
14 }
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1 function bsk_files_manager_file_upload_file ( $file ,
$destination_name_prefix , /* ... */ ){
2
if (! $file [" name " ]) {
3
return false ;
4
}
5
if ( $file [" error "] != 0 ){
6
return false ;
7
}
8
// ...
9
$destinate_file_name = $destination_name_prefix . '_ '.
10
sanitize_file_name ( $file [" name " ]) ;
11
$ret = move_uploaded_file ( $file [" tmp_name "],
12
/* ... */ . $this -> _files_upload_folder
13
. $destinate_file_name );
14
// ...
15
return $destinate_file_name ;
16 }

8
PATH . '/ images / ' . $name );
9
}
10 }
11 function imagements_verify_post_data ( $commentdata ){
12
if ( isset ( $_POST [ ' checkbox ' ]) ) {
13
if ( $_FILES [ ' image '][ ' name '] != null ) {
14
if ( $_FILES [" file " ][ " error "] > 0) {
15
// ...
16
} else {
17
if (!( $_FILES [ ' image '][ ' type '] == ' image /x - png ' ||
18
$_FILES [ ' image '][ ' type '] == ' image / pjpeg ' ||
19
$_FILES [ ' image '][ ' type '] == ' image / jpeg ' ||
20
$_FILES [ ' image '][ ' type '] == ' image / jpg ' ||
21
$_FILES [ ' image '][ ' type '] == ' image / png ')) {
22
wp_die ( ' this ␣ file ␣ is ␣ no ␣ image ... ');
23
}
24
}
25
}
26
// ...
27
}
28 }

Listing 7: Vulnerable Code in BSK Files Manager 1.0.0

Listing 9: Vulnerable Code in Imagements 1.2.5

successfully revealed this vulnerability is presented in Listing 8; it
only concerns the name of the file to be saved since the reachability
constraint is not tainted by the name of the uploaded file.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

function is_vulnerable ( $sym_files_upload_folder ,
$bsk_files_manager_file_id ,
$sym_file_name , $sym_file_ext ,
$sym_FILES_error ,
/* ... */ )
{
$exp_reach = (!( $sym_file_name . $sym_file_ext ) and
$sym_FILES_error != 0 and /* ... */ );
$exp_filename = /* ... */ . $sys_files_upload_folder .
trim ( $bsk_files_manager_file_id ) . '_ ' .
sanitize_file_name ( $sym_file_name . $sym_file_ext );
if ( $exp_reach ) {
$ext = pathinfo ( $exp_filename , PATHINFO_EXTENSION );
if ( $ext == ' php ') {
return true ;
}
}
return false ;
}

1 function is_Vulnerable ( string $sym_const_PATH ,
2
string $sym_file_name ,
3
string $sym_file_ext ){
4
$exp_filename = $sym_const_PATH . '/ images / ' .
5
( $sym_file_name . $sym_file_ext );
6
$ext = pathinfo ( $exp_filename , PATHINFO_EXTENSION );
7
if ( in_array ( $ext , array ( ' php '))) {
8
return true ;
9
}
10
return false ;
11 }

Listing 10: A Fuzzing Template for Imagements 1.2.5

Sanitizing at the Client: User-Management-PHP-MYSQL [25] is
an open-source web application collected from GitHub. Listing 11
presents the client-side HTML page and the server-side PHP script
to process the file submission request. The developer seems aware
of this vulnerability and implemented the validation function at
the client using JavaScript (i.e., by only allowing files with “jpg” or
“jpeg” extensions). Unfortunately, since an attacker has full control
of her browser, she can either disable this validation function or
manipulate the file name carried by the POST request. Listing 12
presents the fuzzing template that reveals this vulnerability.

Listing 8: A Fuzzing Template for BSK Files Manager 1.0.0

Sanitizing Incorrect Sources: Imagements 1.2.5 [37] is a
WordPress plugin that supports a visitor to leave an imagebased comment in users’ blogs. Listing 9 presents the vulnerable code snippet. The function “add_action()” is a WordPress
built-in API to bind a function (“imagments_formverwerking()”
in this case) with an action(i.e. “comment_post” in this case).
The “imagments_formverwerking()” function intends to permanently store an uploaded file in the server. The developer seems
aware of this type of vulnerability and uses a filter (see the
“add_filter()” function) to abort any uploading action if it submits
a non-image file. Unfortunately, the added filter is flawed. It investigates $_FILES[‘image’][‘type’], which is the type of the file
derived from the client’s request. Since an attacker has full control of client-side software (e.g., the browser), she can upload a
PHP executable script and meanwhile instrument the browser to
change $_FILES[‘image’][‘type’] to “image/png”, successfully bypassing this filter. The fuzzing template that successfully reveals
this vulnerability was illustrated in Listing 10.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

1 add_action ( ' comment_post ' , ' imagements_formverwerking ');
2 add_filter ( ' preprocess_comment ' , ' imagements_verify_post_data ');
3 function imagements_formverwerking () {
4
if ( isset ( $_POST [ ' checkbox ' ]) ){
5
$name = $_FILES [ ' image '][ ' name '];
6
// ...
7
move_uploaded_file ( $_FILES [" image " ][ " tmp_name "],
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<? php
if ( isset ( $_POST [ ' submit ']) ){
$file = $_FILES [ ' image '][ ' name ' ];
$final_file = str_replace ( '␣ ' , '- ' , strtolower ( $file ));
if ( move_uploaded_file ( $_FILES [ ' image ' ][ ' tmp_name '],
" images /" . $final_file )) {
// ...
}
}
?>
<! doctype html >
< html lang =" en " class ="no - js " >
<! - -... - - >
function validate () {
var extensions = new Array (" jpg " , " jpeg ");
var final_ext = // Get the file extensions by JavaScript
// return true if the final_ext is in extensions
// return false otherwise
}
< form method =" post " <! - -... - - > onSubmit =" return ␣ validate () ;" >
<! - -... - - >
< button <! - -... - - > type =" submit " > Register </ button >
</ form >
<! - -... - - >
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25 </ html >

not handle other OOP features such as inheritance, function overriding, and deserialization. Since UFuzzer directly interprets AST,
it takes little effort to represent a loop statement in a heap graph.
However, significant challenges arise when one intends to execute a
loop-included fuzzing template with mutated inputs. Specifically, it
would be difficult to identify reasonable variable values to exercise
a generated loop effectively and efficiently. Therefore, we skip the
process of loops in the current implementation.
The practical impact of such incomplete interpretation is however alleviated by the “locality analysis” of UFuzzer’s interpreter,
which inherits from UChecker. Specifically, we first use “locality
analysis” to identify statements that are likely to be relevant to the
vulnerability and then only symbolically interpret these identified
statements. These identified statements, which usually represent a
very small portion of the entire program, rarely contain advanced
OOP features and loops in our evaluated and scanned cases. This
suggests a limited impact on our current implementation.
Nevertheless, extending UFuzzer’s interpretation capability
could enhance its detection capabilities. For example, we can track
the relationship of classes when they are declared to interpret OOP
polymorphism features. We can execute a loop-included fuzzing
template through massive parallelization. Such solutions fall into
our future work, and our plan to open UFuzzer’s code will also
facilitate the community’s efforts towards this direction.
Focusing on the File Extension: UFuzzer investigates whether an
uploaded file could have the “.php” extension, which represents an
immediate, arguably the most significant and common exploitation
of the studied vulnerability. It might also be risky if one can submit
a file of executable content without executable extension to a web
system. However, it requires additional exploitations to execute
the file (e.g., altering file names via other interfaces). Nevertheless,
we acknowledge that it will enhance UFuzzer by analyzing the
executable content in an uploaded file.
Replicating Exploitations Using Template Inputs: UFuzzer “fuzzes” a
fuzzing template that approximates the original code rather than
the original code itself. Therefore, an input that successfully “exploits” the fuzzing template is unlikely to be directly reused to
reproduce the exploitation in the operating web system corresponding to this fuzzing template. Nevertheless, these template inputs
will drastically help a fuzzer reduce the space of the fuzzing inputs.
Again, our design associates a template input with an uninitialized
variable, a superglobal variable, or the output of an operation/API.
Therefore, an input associated with a superglobal variable can be
directly used for exploitation; an input associated with an operation/API can be used to guide a fuzzer to generate the input(s) for
this operation/API that will lead to wanted template inputs.
False Positives: Although UFuzzer has not introduced any false positives in our experiments using a large set of real-world applications,
it is still possible for UFuzzer to introduce false positives for two
major reasons. First, it does not model the configuration of web
servers that could mitigate such vulnerabilities at run time. For example, a server could be configured (e.g, in .htaccess or php.ini)
to completely disable file uploading for the entire web system. Nevertheless, we believe UFuzzer’s detected vulnerabilities, although
only concerning flawed code, are useful to improve systems’ fundamental security despite the fact they cannot be exploited due to
runtime configuration. Second, a fuzzing template may fail to model

Listing 11: Vulnerable Code in User-Management-PHP-MYSQL
1 function is_Vulnerable_0 ( string $sym_file_name , string
$sym_file_ext ){
2
$exp_filename = ' ../ images / ' . str_replace ( '␣ ' , '- ' ,
strtolower ( $sym_file_name . $sym_file_ext ));
3
$ext = pathinfo ( $exp_filename , PATHINFO_EXTENSION );
4
if ( in_array ( $ext , array ( ' php '))) {
5
return true ;
6
}
7
return false ;
8 }

Listing
12:
A
Fuzzing
User-Management-PHP-MYSQL

6

Template

for

RELATED WORK

The majority of web-server-oriented vulnerability detection methods employ static program analysis, where representative ones
include [6, 9, 10, 14, 27, 28, 31, 35, 39]. These methods focus on a
variety of well-known vulnerabilities such as SQL injection, XSS,
and DoS. A few other methods [3, 4, 13, 18, 21, 34, 36] employ
fuzzing or penetration testing to reveal vulnerabilities and failures
in server-side web applications. A few other tools such as JBroFuzz [29], Wapiti [30], Wfuzz [16], Burp [24], and w3af [33] are
also built to fuzzing HTTP requests through interception. While
these methods have shown great promise in detecting server-side
web vulnerabilities, they focus on conventional ones other than
unrestricted file upload vulnerabilities.
A few existing projects [2, 7, 10, 26, 32] analyzed unrestricted
file upload vulnerabilities without delivering detection capabilities.
RIPS [9, 11] and WAP [20], and UChecker [15] claim their capabilities of detecting unrestricted file upload vulnerabilities. RIPS [9, 11]
leverages static taint analysis while WAP[20] combines taint analysis and machine learning. RIPS and WAP are prone to low detection performance of this specific type of vulnerabilities since
taint-analysis is over-approximating to model the exploitation. The
learning-based software defect detection commonly suffers from
the data sparsity challenge [1], where program samples with the
same vulnerability usually fall short for both quantity and diversity.
UChecker [15] and FUSE [17] are designed to detect unrestricted
file upload vulnerabilities. UChecker symbolically interprets a PHP
application and generates constraints that model conditions to successfully exploit a vulnerability. Unfortunately, the semantic gaps
between PHP and the solver language introduce intrinsic challenges
for constraint modeling. FUSE employs black-box fuzzing and it
requires the tested web to be fully operable. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that the FUSE employs more types of exploitation inputs
(i.e., PHP, XHTML, and JS) compared to the current implementation of UFuzzer, which currently focuses on PHP. While we plan to
extend UFuzzer to cover more types of exploitation inputs in the
future, UFuzzer can immediately complement UChecker and FUSE.

7

DISCUSSION

Incomplete Interpretation of OOP and Loops: The current implementation of UFuzzer does not interpret all PHP grammars. Although it interprets essential OOP grammars including class declaration, object
initialization, and the invocation of member functions, UFuzzer does
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the context of uninitialized variables and symbolized operations,
which however could involve sanitization actions. A potential solution to address this challenge is to trade efficiency for accuracy,
such as interpreting more statements and modeling symbolized
operations with finer granularity.
False Negatives: UFuzzer introduces one false negative in detecting
new vulnerable applications. This is because the mutation process is
unguided and therefore it cannot guarantee the generation of values
that provably satisfy certain conditions in the fuzzing template. A
potential solution is to integrate UFuzzer and UChecker, where we
can infer values for applicable variables using a solver and mutate
values for the remaining.
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CONCLUSION

We have built UFuzzer to automatically detect PHP-based web programs with unrestricted file upload vulnerabilities. UFuzzer models
a server-side PHP web application using heap graphs and automatically identifies sub-graphs that are relevant to a vulnerability.
Identified sub-graphs are refactored and eventually converted into
executable PHP programs for fuzzing. The evaluation results based
on real-world PHP applications demonstrated UFuzzer’s high detection performance. It also detects 31 new vulnerable services that
have not been publicly reported, contributing 5 CVEs.
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